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Effervescence and Ephemerality:
Popular Urban Uprisings in Mozambique
Bjørn Enge Bertelsen
University of Bergen, Norway
abstract This article analyses the large-scale popular urban uprisings that shook
Mozambican cities on 1 and 2 September 2010, following the government’s announce-
ment of successive rises in the price of public transport fares and basic commodities.
Using ethnographic material from the city of Chimoio and the capital Maputo, the fol-
lowing work highlights the organisational character of the ‘strikes’ (greves), as the
popular uprisings were called, and explores them as a new form of organising political
discontent. Comparing them to other historical and contemporary popular uprisings,
this article argues that the strikes violently and rhizomically generated ephemeral
and egalitarian forms of political authority and order that simultaneously confronted,
replicated and undercut the aspects of Mozambican statehood. Deploying Durkheim’s
notion of effervescence, the work further argues that the creative fervour, multisemic
aspects and festive character of the popular uprisings need to be recognised; thus, this
analysis challenges the reductive labelling of these events as ‘riots’ or ‘food riots’.
keywords Effervescence, Mozambique, popular uprising, rhizome, sovereignty
Whenwewalked down the streets and tore into the shops and tookwhatwewanted – it
was fantastic! We also controlled the roundabouts and bridges – chasing the police off.
Andwewent to the police station, shouted and sang.They [thepolice] had tohide. They
were afraid! It was fantastic – it was popular power [poder popular] all over again and we
organised everything ourselves. We could do what we want and everyone was happy!
A month after Chimoio’s urban protests on 1 and 2 September 2010, this ishow a 22-year-old man excitedly described them to me while I wascarrying out ﬁeldwork. Many elements are contained in this typical
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quotation but worth noting are the emancipatory, collectively egalitarian and
festive elements of what its participants referred to as o greve – ‘the strike’.
Indeed, the self-organisation, the takeover of state infrastructural space and the
fervour of networked mass mobilisation are central aspects of the strikes that
have repeatedly challenged Mozambican state sovereignty in recent years. Cor-
responding to what my interlocutors call os greves (‘the strikes’) and what I,
inspired by Badiou’s (2012: 90) notion, will term ‘popular uprisings’, the strikes
thereby seem to challenge Jean-Franc¸ois Bayart’s famous claim (1993) that the
African state is rhizomically constituted in that it relies on extensive, dynamic
and changing networks that lie beyond and below the reach of its formal
domains. Contra Bayart’s claim, the 2010 strike was preceded by similar events
in 2008, calling into question a reading of the state as incorporating fully powerful
rhizomic domains. Gripping cities for several days, the scale of the 2008 and 2010
strikes was such that they encompassed both the urban spaces normally associ-
ated with sovereignty and engaged rhizomic networks and capacities beyond the
reach of the Mozambican post-colonial state. What is more, the strikes were fre-
quently characterised by a festive atmosphere of upheaval, creativity and collec-
tivity – traits that Durkheim more than a century ago identiﬁed as key to
dynamics of not only ritual and sociality but also of historical rupture and politics:
There are periods in history when, under the inﬂuence of some great collective shock,
social interactions have becomemore frequent and active.Men look for each other and
assemble together more than ever. That general effervescence results which is charac-
teristic of revolutionary or creative epochs . . . Changes are not merely of shades and
degrees; men become different. The passions moving them are of such an intensity
that they cannot be satisﬁed except by violent and unrestrained actions, actions of
superhuman heroism or bloody barbarism. (Durkheim 2008 [1915]: 210f)1
Informed by such a perspective on effervescence (also supported by Karen
E. Fields’ [1995: xl-xliii] of this), and taking the Mozambican strikes as con-
forming to his notion of ‘great collective shocks’, this article approaches
these events as irreducible to the oft-applied label of ‘food riots’ (cf. Walton
& Sneddon 2011). Further, and contrary to much research on Mozambican
urban situations and politics, which is generally based on Maputo material
(see, for instance, Sumich 2010; 2013 for two incisive analyses), this work
also incorporates substantial material from Chimoio, the provincial capital of
Manica province. Through mapping and analysing urban sites also beyond
Maputo, it has been possible to highlight how post-colonial state contexts
entail a networked and, often, incomplete articulation of sovereignty and
2 bjørn enge bertelsen
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political authority in urban spaces. Consequently, the following argument pre-
sents the sovereign formations of African states neither as necessarily emanat-
ing from an imagined or spatially deﬁned centre nor as a formation based on
the control of rhizomic domains, as in Bayart’s argument. Instead, the follow-
ing work explores how the Mozambican political order has been involved in
recurring confrontations that have produced unsettling effects, which ulti-
mately underscore the contested and partial nature of post-colonial sover-
eignty (see also Hansen & Stepputat 2005). It analyses the ways in which
such sovereignty has been ephemerally appropriated by novel political for-
mations, such as the popular uprisings, as well as how lateral, egalitarian and
digital dimensions have been integral to their trajectory and articulation.
New political formations, such as those manifested through the strikes, are
also characterised by multiple political aims and by multisemic strategies.
Finally, such formations are frequently experienced as effervescent, festive
and carnivalesque events by their participants.
Interlude: Text Messages, Unrest and Trans-African Political Fears
In an age in which tropes of representative democracy, human rights and
civil society are hegemonic and ubiquitous (Fassin 2012), it might be
assumed that protests and popular uprisings would disappear. Not so, a long
historical trajectory of insurgence and protest across northern Africa and the
Middle East (Fosshagen 2014) and, more generally, new global, radical for-
mations of urban protest have again made relevant debates about the potential
these have to effect profound political change (see, e.g. Badiou 2012; Harvey
2012). Such potential for change has not gone unnoticed by southern African
political leaders. At a Southern African Development Community meeting in
April 2011, the Chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Cooperation, Zambian president Rupiah Banda, warned heads of state: ‘If
there is anything that we must learn from the upheavals going on in the north-
ern part of our continent it is that the legitimate expectations of the citizens of
our countries cannot be taken for granted’ (quoted in Zhangazha 2011). Presi-
dent Banda’s warning came after southern Africa experienced the effects of
protests, following a text message that went viral in neighbouring Mozambique
during mid-August 2010:
Mozambican – prepare yourself for the great day of strike [greve] 01/09/10. We will
reclaim the rise in prices in electricity, water, rice, public transport and bread. Send to
other Mozambicans.2
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
Effervescence and Ephemerality 3
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
tsb
ibl
iot
ek
et 
i B
erg
en
] a
t 0
1:4
4 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 
Displaying the ubiquitous emoticon, this text message may seem innocent
enough, and the Mozambican authorities seem to have regarded it as such.
Nevertheless, early on Thursday, 1 September 2010, following a shutdown of
public transport, large numbers of people poured onto the streets of the
capital Maputo; similar events occurred in the cities of Beira, Chimoio and
Matola. The Maputo crowds were engaged in a popular uprising rather than
a conventional ‘strike’; however, burning heaps of tyres as barricades on main
roads, and overturning vehicles, the participants succeeded in blocking key
roads into and around the city centre for two days.3 Despite heavy-handed
police intervention, including the use of live ammunition and tear gas (which
killed 14 people, including young children), the two-day strike witnessed wide-
spread looting of shops and warehouses, which especially targeted food staples,
such as rice and cooking oil (CIP 2010). Such events were not unprecedented in
Mozambique, however, protesting against multiple price rises, a popular upris-
ing similarly called a ‘strike’ (greve) was initiated on 5 February 2008 and had also
rocked Maputo and eventually spread to other cities including Chimoio. As in
2010, the upheavals of 2008 had involved looting, the takeover of urban spaces
and the deaths of protesters.4
From Portuguese Rule to Poder Popular and Beyond
The strikes of 2008 and 2010 unfolded in a country that historically has been
rocked by various forms of political violence and long-standing contestations
over sovereignty and territorial control. Crucially, Portuguese colonialism, as
it took hold in what was later to be called Mozambique, was contested from
initial struggles for control in the 1500s until the Portuguese state ceded its
African colonies in 1975 (Newitt 1995). A decisive blow to Portuguese rule in
Mozambique began with the liberation movement Frelimo (Frente de Liberta-
c¸a˜o de Moc¸ambique), which fought against Portuguese rule from 1964 until 1975.
With Frelimo’s ascendance to power upon independence in 1975, Mozambique
embarked on a revolutionary path of development with a particular socialist
orientation (Isaacman 1978). Instituted as a one-party regime, Frelimo set out
both to radically transform the structural inequalities left by the colonial
period and to lead o povo – the people – to a new era of prosperity and equality.
This radical politics involved the targeting of what was seen as obscurantism:
traditional leaders, chiefs and healers were seen as relics of the colonial
regime who were to be substituted by party secretaries and medical doctors
(Bertelsen in press).
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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While initially successful, Frelimo’s implementation of a revolutionary poli-
tics was severely hampered by a civil war between 1977 and 1992 wherein
Renamo (Resisteˆncia Nacional de Moc¸ambique), funded externally (initially
by Rhodesia and thereafter South Africa), sought to destabilise the regime
(Nordstrom 1997). Despite its extreme violence, Renamo paradoxically experi-
enced widespread rural support in certain regions, largely from peasants antag-
onistic towards Frelimo’s radical modernising project (Geffray 1990). The
country’s ﬁrst free elections in 1994 reﬂected such support and Renamo and
Frelimo – both conventional political parties at this stage – almost divided
the electorate between them, with Frelimo winning by a narrow margin.
Since then, Frelimo has remained in ofﬁce, Renamo remains a key opposition
party and political force, and Mozambique has emerged from the ashes of
civil war with an impressive annual GDP growth rate averaging 8.3% annually
between 1997 and 2008 (Cunguara & Hanlon 2012: 627).
Until recently, most donors (and many researchers) contended that Mozam-
bique’s post-civil war development was successful, that economic growth was
‘trickling down’ and that the country was ‘on the right track’ supported by
the IMF, the World Bank, multiple bilateral aid agreements and numerous
NGOs (Cle´ment & Peiris 2008). In 2009, therefore, the shock among donors
was great when reports showed that despite allegedly sustained economic
growth for almost two decades, poverty was actually increasing rather than
decreasing (Cunguara 2012). Lately, Mozambique has experienced an image
problem: the still much-used socialist rhetoric of A luta continua – ‘The struggle
continues’ – is now popularly expressed by my interlocutors and others as A
pobreza continua – ‘Poverty continues’.5
The image of Mozambique as a post-conﬂict success story is also increas-
ingly questioned by the country’s donors (Cunguara 2012) – sometimes due
to the mixed effects of a donor-supported multipronged campaign for decentra-
lisation within a range of domains, such as justice, local administration and
health (Manning & Marlbrough 2012; McKay 2012). While undoubtedly produ-
cing signiﬁcant structural changes, such developments also need to be framed
within a wider political–economic context: after the destruction of state infra-
structure and resources during the civil war, in the 1990s, the country suffered
the most wide-ranging programme for privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa – a
process involving corrupt accumulation and rampant asset stripping as well
as what Santos (2006) terms ‘the production of a weak state’. Further, within
the domain of justice, the decentralisation of state powers has included the
introduction of a community police force (polı´cia comunita´ria) that was
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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formed as a result of the low standing and violence of the regular police (Kyed
2009; 2012; Bertelsen 2010; 2011). The establishment of these community police
forces has coincided with a dramatic increase in popular lynchings, as well as
the emergence of police-led death squads (Bertelsen 2009b). Arguably, there-
fore, for the urban population in the bairros (urban quarters), an effect of
donor-driven decentralisation policies has been the pluralisation of authority
structures (Santos 2006).
Taken together, trends such as increased poverty, a multiplication of both
forms of violence and of authorities in poor urban contexts and an increasingly
business-oriented one-party state system are generally experienced by my
Chimoio and Maputo interlocutors as comprising the backdrop for the two
recent Mozambican popular uprisings.
Maputo Strikes: Barricading, Looting and Protection
As can be discerned from the text message copied above, an apparently
unknown source called for a national ‘strike’ (greve) on 1 September 2010; sub-
sequently, people ﬂooded onto the streets of Mozambican bairros.6 A young
man whom I talked to in January 2013 recalled these events:
There was singing and dancing everywhere – on the roundabouts, in the streets!
Some were drinking. Many were singing ‘Guebuza is a thief’ [Guebuza – ladra˜o!]
Many of my neighbours participated. People I did not know also. Many also took
things from the stores that they wanted. It was good!
The alleged thief referenced here was Armando Guebuza – the current presi-
dent of Mozambique and leader of Frelimo. Soon, however, the ‘street party’
aspects of the strike were supplemented by multiple forms of physical protest
and violence primarily directed at two urban dimensions: the spaces and
domains of the state and objects of wealth. Underlining the carnivalesque and
uncontainable elements of the 2010 strike, a woman in her mid-20s from
Bairro Maxaquene C, a low-income, high-density part of Maputo, told me:
The strike [greve] is called xitereka in Shangaan.7 Xitereka is better than calling it greve.
It means a state of disorganization – where everyone could do what they want. Xiter-
eka was a good thing. It showed Frelimo that we do not like them. That they make
things too expensive and that it is dangerous to keep all the nice things for themselves
only. So we marched to the places with these things.
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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As reﬂected in this extract from an interview in 2013, the strike (or xitereka)
involved the targeting of certain state spaces: early on the ﬁrst day, many
main roads leading to Maputo’s city centre were ﬁlled with large crowds –
young and old, men, women and children – who descended on passing
vehicles; they overturned a number of minibuses, buses and cars and set them
ablaze. Attacks on vehicles soon gave way to the construction of large barri-
cades of burning tyres, which made it perilous to try to pass by car: those
who attempted it were pelted with stones, bricks or other hard objects. A
vast number of supermarkets, shops and large warehouses were also invaded
and ransacked. People were mainly after rice, cooking oil and ﬂour – the
goods mentioned in the text message as being subject to price rises – but all
kinds of items were taken, including refrigerators, telephones, computers and
furniture.
The widespread looting and the state’s loss of control of urban spaces did not
go unchallenged. The Mozambican police were sent onto the streets to con-
front the participants, and in many bairros they employed extreme force in
their efforts to repress protesters. Using tear gas indiscriminately – even deploy-
ing it where they themselves would suffer the effects due to the wind direction –
large crowds of people were forcibly moved from location to location. The
police also ﬁred both live ammunition and rubber bullets directly into groups
of people, killing at least 14 people. Unsurprisingly, reports on police behaviour
were damning, emphasising unpreparedness, fatigue, lack of training and the
absence of a clear chain of command, as well as the use of disproportionate vio-
lence (CIP 2010).
The popular uprising lasted two full days, crippled the Mozambican capital
and prevented urbanites from getting to work from outlying bairros using mini-
buses (called chapa or chapa 100), which were their primary mode of transport.
As businesses effectively ground to a halt and almost no vehicles dared travel
the roads, the central parts of Maputo became deserted. However, some of
the bairros in which the wealthy and powerful lived were exempted from
attack. In Maputo, this included the Sommerschild bairro, which comprised
foreign development workers, diplomats, politicians and middle- to upper-
class Mozambicans (AfricaFocus 2010). This use of police to protect the
wealthy and powerful from the melee of the strike that was unfolding in
other central as well as more peripheral bairros conforms to an increasingly
global uneven distribution of urban security and protection. As Paasche and
Sidaway (2010: 1566) assert, the trend is towards a ‘commoditisation and frag-
mentation of security provision in Maputo combined with the inability and/
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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or withdrawal of the state to monopolise the coercive use of force’ (see also
Buur et al. 2006). Moreover, the dramatic events such as those of 2008 and
2010 feed into and sustain urban imaginaries of dividedness, exclusion and abjec-
tion that are experienced by urban inhabitants who occupy the spaces adjoining
these wealthy and well-securitised areas (Bertelsen et al. 2013).
The Anatomy of the Strike in Chimoio
Chimoio, the provincial capital of Manica, has around 200,000 inhabitants
and is located in the Beira corridor some 100 km from the Zimbabwean
border. In recent decades, its bairros have grown steadily, attracting migrants
ﬂeeing Zimbabwe as well as some rural to urban (partly seasonal) migration;
I have observed this process during a number of ﬁeldwork studies in urban
and peri-urban Chimoio since 1998 (see also Lubkemann 2008). Visiting
Chimoio in October 2010, a month after the popular uprising and, again, in
July and August 2011, the following is based mainly on interviews, reports and
ﬁeldwork carried out over this period.
In key ways, the trajectory of the popular uprising in Chimoio reﬂected that
in Maputo: roads to the town centre were barricaded in order to block trafﬁc.
This takeover of the transport infrastructure included a few crucial roundabouts,
such as the symbolically important Prac¸a dos Herois (Heroes’ Square), which
enshrines and commemorates Mozambique’s liberation struggle and celebrates
Frelimo’s role in it. A few bridges were also controlled by participants including,
notably, a bridge to the north of the city centre, which made access to the popu-
lous Bairro Nhamahonha difﬁcult. In addition, central communications, includ-
ing telephone lines, were cut, as were electricity lines. Police stations and police
cars were attacked and, as in Maputo, the Chimoio police applied indiscrimi-
nate force, eventually killing some individuals and injuring many more.
Alert to the developments in Maputo, Chimoio and other cities, the Minister
for the Interior, Jose´ Pacheco, appeared on national television at 1 pm on the ﬁrst
day of the 2010 strike. Intending to calm things down Pacheco ﬁrmly rejected
the notion that the government would back down on the price hikes and
also attempted to blame Renamo for the protests. Later that afternoon,
Pacheco was replaced on national television by President Armando Guebuza
– the man represented as a thief by many Chimoio protesters. Guebuza
denounced the strike as a series of violent acts of vandalism, in an obvious
attempt to depoliticise the situation and criminalise its participants. Somewhat
paradoxically, Guebuza also repeated the Frelimo government’s slogans – ‘Pro-
duction is the way out of poverty’ and ‘With Frelimo we will win against
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
8 bjørn enge bertelsen
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
tsb
ibl
iot
ek
et 
i B
erg
en
] a
t 0
1:4
4 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 
poverty’. Neither televised announcement had the intended effect and protes-
ters continued to pour onto the streets. The popular uprising was helped, my
interlocutors argue, by the private television channel STV: from 9.30 am,
STV ran live coverage of the events with camera teams trawling Maputo
bairros documenting where and how people were protesting.
By the time the events subsided during the afternoon of 2 September, the
Mozambican government had brought in two measures beyond the largely
failed attempts of violent crackdown and dissuasion through public announce-
ments. Firstly, it backed down and claimed there would be no price rises, thus
awarding the participants a victory in these terms. Secondly, it is widely believed
the government managed to coerce the two dominant telecom companies –
Vodacom and the national company Mcel – to shut down or seriously impair
national text messaging services (AFP 2010). This shutdown effectively meant
a halt in the spread of information among participating groups and individuals
and has in early 2014 been followed up by a motion to criminalise the spreading
of text messages, emails and publications that ‘insult or endanger the security of
the state’ (translated and quoted from Club of Mozambique 2014).
This kind of communications blackout is not unique to Mozambique: fol-
lowing their 2005 election, the Ethiopian government shut down the ability
to send text messages for two years, fearing their potential use by opposition
parties (Eagle 2010: 15). Likewise, responding to urban protests in July 2011
(AFP 2011), the Malawian government blocked access to certain news websites,
Facebook and Twitter. In research terms, although Tom Lodge (2013: 151) is too
optimistic in claiming that ‘[a]ll over Africa, the spread of communications tech-
nology has had an empowering effect for ordinary people’, the potential use of
digital technology in governance, security and elections is increasingly an
important subject of study in Africa and beyond (see Hellstro¨m 2011; Poblet
2011, for example).
This more general trend of a digital component in an African politics of dis-
content (and its containment) was clearly present in the events outlined here in
Mozambique: importantly, the state’s (likely) intervention in telecommunica-
tions, its use of violence and the relative ease with which participants achieved
their immediate goals underline the need to understand both the anatomy and
the fervour of the popular uprisings and the organisation of political and social
discontent within the African state.
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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The Rhizome of the Strikes
Since protesters sent text messages using ‘pay-as-you-go’ SIM cards pur-
chased from informal street vendors, it was almost impossible for the government
to identify senders or receivers. Until after the 2010 strike, 95% of mobile phones
users in Mozambique used such street-bought SIM cards with no obligation to
register their details (Archambault 2011). This situation has now changed, as
the Mozambican state has made it compulsory for all users to register their
SIM cards (Mabila et al. 2010: 4). At the time of the 2008 and 2010 strikes,
however, the lateral spread of text messages reﬂected the organisational
dynamic of the popular uprisings: there was no apparent hierarchical structure
in the form of a recognised leadership that endured (even within the context of
the popular uprisings), as would have been the case had this been a ‘strike’ in a
conventional sense of being organised by a trade union, for instance.
More surprising, perhaps, is that while it might have been expected that
Renamo would be involved – it is Mozambique’s largest opposition party
and regarded as crucial to the country’s mostly peaceful post-war political
development – it was not, to any signiﬁcant degree, despite the allegations
made by Interior Minister Pacheco and President Guebuza on national televi-
sion. Indeed, my interlocutors from both Maputo and Chimoio hold that
Renamo played no organising role whatsoever and, hence, did not inﬂuence
the level of popular participation and the extent to which the uprisings
spread within and between Mozambican cities. This view is corroborated by
the fact that post hoc Renamo failed to claim responsibility for or leadership
in the strike or to transform these events into forms of political and symbolic
capital. This is especially signiﬁcant in Chimoio, as there, and throughout the
province of Manica, Renamo has historically received the majority of provincial
votes in presidential and parliamentary elections. Musing on Renamo’s absence
in relation to the strike, a young Chimoio man from the afore-mentioned Bairro
Nhamahonha commented to me in October 2010:
Ah, Renamo! They used to be big, they used to have power! During the war, they beat
Frelimo. Hard! They brought order – they brought the chiefs back. They did all! But
now, ah, they are sitting in Maputo eating the way Frelimo has always eaten. Now
Renamo has no power. And Frelimo does not want to change anything. So, the
people [o povo] need to show them how to solve things.
What is indicated here, and expressed by several other interlocutors, is that
recent events such as the spate of lynchings, as well as the 2008 popular uprising,
paved the way for a mode of popular direct engagement with the state – in
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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particular with its elite and its accumulation of wealth (Bertelsen 2009a; 2014;
see also Serra 2008). In a context in which the two dominant political parties
were perceived either to have retreated from politics (Frelimo) or to have lost
their traction (Renamo), the strike’s speed and lateral egalitarian organisation
assumed signiﬁcance (see also Cahen 2010). At one level, therefore, the
dynamic of the popular uprising resembled what Deleuze and Guattari (2002
[1980]: 358), using the example of ‘bands’, call the rhizomic form:
Packs, bands are groups of the rhizome type, as opposed to the arborescent type that
centers around the organs of power. That is why bands in general, even those
engaged in banditry or high-society life, are metamorphoses of a war machine
formally distinct from all State apparatuses or their equivalent, which are instead
what structure centralized societies.
In this sense, the form of the band – which resembles key aspects of the lateral
and ﬂuctuating form of an insurrectionary popular uprising – exhibits the unset-
tling potential inherent in rhizomic social and political orders that also reside
beyond the reach of the state.
Appropriating the Spaces and Wealth of the State
The strikes’ instant, acephalous, rhizomic and ‘band-like’ features notwith-
standing, the protesters also, if ephemerally, occupied key state spaces and infra-
structural points, including bridges, roundabouts and main roads. This
particularly affected Chimoio’s bairro cimento (‘cement city’) – the city
centre, which comprise zones of business, wealth and the state. Crucially, this
temporary isolation of the bairro cimento had its corollary in the spatial
dynamics of lynchings, which have occurred regularly in Chimoio and other
Mozambican cities in recent years (Bertelsen 2009a). In the context of the
afore-mentioned decentralisation initiative, these events resulted in people per-
ceiving there to be a police presence only in the bairro cimento while some
municipal authorities were seen to condone lynchings in the poor bairros. As
an effect of these processes, the lynchings have been distributed in a centrifugal
manner to urban spaces that are peripheral to the Mozambican state.
The dynamics of the strikes indicate a similar spatial dimension but with a
centripetal force: rather than impoverished bairros being abandoned by the
state it was the bairro cimento, the very space of the state and wealth, that
was unsettled and targeted. In such a way, the infrastructural insignia of state
control were disordered and re-inscribed, and sometimes directly attacked –
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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as in the case of Chimoio’s main police station and police cars. The participants
engaged, then, in a form of spatial re-negotiation of the state apparatus. That the
2010 strike unfolded in particular spaces was expressed in February 2013 by a
chefe do quartera˜o (neighbourhood leader) from Bairro Maxaquene B – partly
reﬂecting the Mozambican government’s stance of criminalising the
participants:
Good people were silent and did not participate. But the strike [greve] only happened
where there were things. Here [in Maxaquene B] we have nothing. So here nothing
happened. But in other places, ah, a lot! War comes from the stomach, you know.
People need work and things.
Reﬂecting this critique indirectly, other interlocutors who had been participants
commonly held that their actions would provide some form of redress for what
they regarded as illicit accumulation: if the state and business elite were per-
ceived to have merged and to be increasingly wealthy, why should people be
barred from taking part in these riches? Such re-appropriation of wealth was
often explained to me in 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014 as being the rationale for
the looting of supermarkets, shops and other businesses. It was also evident
in an interview carried out with a middle-aged woman from Chimoio’s
Bairro TextAfrica in October 2010. She had participated and saw herself as
having been successful: she had returned with a 20 kg sack of rice and explained
to me why she had participated:
They have eaten for years and years. Peace has come, democracy has come, elections
have come. All has happened – but they are the only ones eating. Our children are
hungry: we should eat as well.
Such direct action against those perceived to be wealthy, greedy and powerful
underlines the clear political dimension that the popular uprisings have for the
participants. However, it also indicates that Mozambicans are neither paciﬁc
nor uninterested in politics – despite having experienced gruesome civil war
violence, an onslaught of neoliberal reforms dismantling state services, and
being continuously under Frelimo rule since 1975 (West 2005). On the contrary,
because the higher echelons of state power have become gradually less centred
on o povo (the people), and as the vision of socialism retains only rhetorical ves-
tiges of its former self, by engaging directly with state agents such as the police,
people address (and actually redress) in practical terms the sources of their mar-
ginalisation and poverty (see also Sumich 2010). A young, unemployed man
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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I interviewed in Chimoio in August 2011 revealed the frequently commented
upon relations among cost of living, the elite and the police:
I participated because I wanted to destroy the shops that are selling everything at a
very high price. We went to the police headquarters [Primeira Esquadra] as well.
There we threw great many rocks at the buildings and all the policemen ran to
hide inside. From there they ﬁred their guns but more in the air than directed at
the population. We went to the police as they are not resolving problems and
cases there. If you [are a criminal and] have money, you are released right away.
If you do not have money to pay the police, you will stay there and get heavily
beaten.
As the young man indicated, the strikes unfolded in particular urban spaces and
had speciﬁc targets (see also Bertelsen 2009a). In Chimoio, this included recent
symbolic and material domains of exclusion and immoral accumulation: the
Chinese and their shops. These were targeted alongside stores owned by
Mozambicans of Indian descent (see also Serra 2010). An important backdrop
for such targeting is that Mozambican newspapers have repeatedly exposed
the fact that members of the Frelimo elite part own large companies otherwise
controlled by Chinese people, people of Indian descent and other non-
Mozambicans (Hanlon 2009; Ribeiro 2010). For my interlocutors, such afﬁnities
and connections between Frelimo and ‘big business’ made these shops natural
targets during the strikes: attacks on them were construed as appropriating the
visible riches of the party and on what was perceived to be its betrayal of o povo
for its own beneﬁt and that of foreign interests.
A simple ‘eat the rich’ interpretation is, however, too crude in this context; in
Maputo, stalls and small shops owned by Nigerians were also targeted to some
extent, while Chimoio market stalls (banca ﬁxas) owned by Somalis were looted
and razed to the ground. These people – Chinese, Nigerians and Somalis – are
not only regarded as successful businessmen at the expense of Mozambicans,
they are also widely believed to control the drugs trade, and to be involved in
vehicle theft and robberies. In Chimoio, Somali stalls in large informal sprawling
markets can hardly be seen as representing the party in power. In addition, and
reﬂecting local politics and civil war memories, the stalls of people from the
northern Mozambican city of Quelimane were looted and burnt. Thus, it
would seem that the participants’ understanding of their marginalisation was
in part shaped by the kinds of xenophobic political dynamics to which Mozam-
bican migrants have been violently subjected at various times – in South Africa
in 2008 (Friebel et al. 2012), for example.
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
Effervescence and Ephemerality 13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
tsb
ibl
iot
ek
et 
i B
erg
en
] a
t 0
1:4
4 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 
‘Now They Are Afraid of Us’: The Strikes as Exuberant and Unsettling
Above, it has been observed that the strikes relate to recent Mozambican
politics in general and to the state in particular. However, we should be cautious
about seeing these Mozambican popular uprisings – and those of North Africa
and the Middle East in the spring of 2011 onwards – as entirely new phenom-
ena. Hobsbawm (1965 [1959]), for instance, examines pre-industrial urbanites
(‘the mob’) involved in ‘primitive rebellion’ in southern Europe: ‘[i]n such
cities the popolino [wage-earners, small property-owners and urban poor]
lived in an odd relationship with its rulers, equally compounded of parasitism
and riot’ (Hobsbawm 1965 [1959]: 115). The description Hobsbawm provides
of this as a political order that cyclically oscillated between modalities of
re-distributive rioting and modes of appropriation by the elite seems to
resemble the recurrence of strikes in Mozambique in 2008 and 2010. Hobsbawm
goes on to note three salient features of ‘the mob’: that it ‘did not merely riot as a
protest, but because it expected to achieve something’; that it was ‘always
directed against the rich and powerful (though not necessarily the ofﬁcial
head of the state or city)’; and that it was infused with hostility towards ‘non-
townsmen’ (Hobsbawm 1965 [1959]: 111f). While some of these aspects
conform to characteristics of the Mozambican popular uprisings – the instru-
mentality of looting and the targeting of conceptual strangers (Indians,
Chinese, Nigerians, Somalis) – the directionality of the strikes ‘against the
rich and powerful’ does not. As shown, Maputo’s and Chimoio’s elite urban
spaces were cordoned off by security, and a number of non-elite targets
(Somali stalls, for example) were also targeted.
Hobsbawm’s orderly account of rebellions resembles analyses that see themas
‘safety valves’ for venting popular frustration; such analyses often employ the
term ‘food riot’ (see Walton and Sneddon 2011). This view smuggles in instru-
mentality, neatly contained in the term ‘disaffection’, and glosses over the
fervour of creativity and the experience of exuberance characterising many
popular uprisings such as those inMozambique.Moreover, the festive experience
my interlocutors recounted corresponds with the atmosphere reported else-
where: an insider account of the 2001 anti-globalisation demonstrations in
Genoa, for example, observes that the running battles with the police and the
smashing up of cars and speciﬁc stores constituted a carnivalesque occasion
(One Off Press 2001); such traits are also often invoked to describe more recent
protests across urbanBritain (Easton 2011). A similar reﬂection is found in anthro-
pologist Sherry Turkle’s (1975) analysis of the symbolic action of festivity charac-
terising the student uprisings in Paris in May 1968. Crucially, Turkle argues that
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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‘[t]hese groups never aim, it seems, to implement a program, but to express the
self instead, or the spontaneity of a new-formed group, freeing themselves by
their protests from structural roles and necessities’ (Turkle 1975: 68).
Similar features are also identiﬁed in several contemporary and historical
studies of Africa. Glassman (1995), for example, underlines the important relation-
ship between religious fervour and large-scale uprisings in Swahili Coast cities in
the late 1800s; he shows that the potential of the festive occasion was underesti-
mated by the German colonial masters. Glassman concludes that such miscalcu-
lation in relation to the ensuing violent events led to a temporary defeat and the
ousting of colonial rulers, arguing that the rituals created an atmosphere in
which uprising and looting was made possible through idioms of feasting. In
the same vein, a study by Villers and Tshonda (2004; see also Boeck 2007)
delves into the large-scale rioting that has characterised urban Kinshasa from
time to time from the 1950s onwards. The 1991 and 1993 Kinshasa protests, for
instance, resulted in subsequent waves of looting: ordinary people followed the
example, ﬁrst, of looting soldiers and then of police ofﬁcers. Many Kinois refer
to these riots as la grande feˆte (the great party) and their dynamic is embedded
in historically produced understandings of political culture and authority, as
well as in modalities of appropriation and redistribution.
Arguably, then, the fervour of the Mozambican strikes and their ludic and
festive elements may not be explained fully either by invoking political instru-
mentality or by arguing for them as blindly reﬂecting crude economic necessity.
Although the ethnographic and historical contexts described above differ
greatly from Chimoio and Maputo in 2010, similarities do exist in terms of
how the popular uprisings involve dynamic forms of egalitarian collectivity
exhibiting a politics of exuberance. Arguably, these elements are contained in
Durkheim’s notion of effervescence, quoted in the introduction of this article,
as integral to great revolutionary or creative periods. Parkin (2007: 246) under-
stands Durkheim’s notion to be necessary if we are to appreciate the force,
volatility and dynamics of the (insurrectionary) crowd:
In other words, effervescence, like the crowd, is inherently ambivalent emotionally,
able to switch moods through a combination of internal and external dynamism.
Inscribed within the bodily constitution of the crowd, then, we have in effervescence
the potential for schismogenesis, expressed as their bodily embrace or violence and
always sheer physical energy.
This notion of effervescence aids our understanding of the sense of thrill and
empowerment that is important to my interlocutors’ experiences of the riots
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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(Groes-Green 2010; see also Verkaaik 2004: 111ff for a related analysis). Further,
my interlocutors strongly emphasise this excitement, which occurred as they
engaged in running battles with police, participated in looting and as they
attacked or appropriated spaces associated with the state. Such multiplicity in
terms of relations between the state and its population has also been argued
by Mbembe (2001), who emphasises that the post-colonial state cannot be
fully grasped in familiar dichotomies such as repressed/repressors or resist-
ance/power. Instead, Mbembe asks us to analyse the playful and the carnival-
esque in epistemologies and practices of power, in which ‘those who
command and those who are supposed to obey are so entangled as to render
both powerless’ (Mbembe 2001: 133).
However, the enmeshed nature of the two (often indiscernible) categories
does not necessarily end in spirals of simulacra or mutual disempowerment
and, again, the strikes as they unfolded are cases in point: beyond the violence
perpetrated by the Mozambican state in trying to quell (rather than contain) the
popular uprising (similar to the Kinshasa case quoted above), many policemen
actively participated in barricading the streets and, in particular, in the looting of
warehouses and shops. Further, interlocutors divulged that not only did ordin-
ary police ofﬁcers take advantage of the popular uprisings to run off with rice
and cooking oil, they also shot tear gas canisters into crowds, drawing in bystan-
ders. This dynamic of carnivalesque, effervescent and transgressive upheaval
was also expressed by a male interlocutor whom I interviewed in October
2010. He is typical of those with whom I spoke: he lives in a Chimoio bairro
that only gained access to electricity in 2010; he is also part of a household in
which most adults are under salaried or work as informal traders. However,
he is atypical in being a police ofﬁcer with the national force who joined the
participants during the ﬁrst day of the 2010 strike:
The strike [greve] was like a big party [ festa grande]. You know, we are poor. And we
have been for a long time – the end of the war changed nothing. The greves, they are
like we are saying ‘Now they are afraid of us!’ It is a good feeling – they can now feel
some of our fear. And we get to take something back from them – from those that are
connected to the party, to the criminals, to the business. They fear us now.
There are several fascinating aspects to this account, the most striking being
that as a police ofﬁcer – far too often regarded as a mere state agent – he par-
ticipated in the strike. The second signiﬁcant aspect (in line with Mbembe’s
vision) is that the form of popular uprising can be seen as one of the only
ways in which people can interact with what they identify as the post-colonial
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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state: its agencies (the police, for instance), its wealthy elite and the objects and
domains of its power (roads, infrastructure, telecommunications). Crucially,
the strikes harboured and actualised the potential for confronting and appro-
priating aspects of Mozambican statehood and the riches of its domains,
spaces and agents. A new form of egalitarian political collectivity emerged,
informing (and informed by) memories and experiences of emancipation
that were contained in what became a general expression: ‘Now they are
afraid of us!’
In Chimoio, I ﬁrst recorded this expression following the 2008 strike, which,
as mentioned above, was successful in that it forced the Mozambican govern-
ment to withdraw (if momentarily) from the announced price rises. Fuelled
by the successes of 2008 and 2010, many of Chimoio’s poorer inhabitants
regard uprisings as a way of sending messages to the elite, which is seen as con-
trolling the state and its mercantile and political affairs. The form and modality
of the popular uprisings, however, transcend this dimension: they are informed
by the Mozambican past and occur in a context of globalised connectivities and
emerging lateral and anti-hierarchical forms of political protest.
Scripting the Strikes: Reappropriating Poder Popular and Global
Inspiration
The directionality and symbolic action of the strikes as ‘sending messages to
the elite’ are reﬂected in the ways in which the participants’ chants changed
from 2008 to 2010. In both events, Frelimo was attacked by protesters using
an inverted form of a song of praise that characterises past and present Mozam-
bican political culture (Vail & White 1991). In 2008 in Chimoio, according to
interlocutors interviewed, two chants were common: ‘Wanhanha kudurissa
Frelimo’, which translates as ‘You are selling at prices that are too high,
Frelimo’ and ‘Kudurissa noinda Frelimo’, which means, ‘Even the smallest
things are expensive, Frelimo’.8 Signiﬁcantly, both chants directly related experi-
ences of escalating costs to the ruling party. Similar reasoning was evident in
September 2010 but now the chant indicated historical depth: ‘Wadjaira kudur-
issa Frelimo’, which means, ‘You are now used to selling at prices that are too
high, Frelimo’. In addition to the chants’ consistent addressee (Frelimo), the
2010 version contains a more pronounced threat in emphasising that Frelimo
had still not learnt from the past.
There are two important aspects to these chants that require closer inspection
here. Firstly, the rhetoric of ‘taking back’ and ‘sending messages’ is frequently
associated with the notion of poder popular (popular power). Poder popular used
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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to animate and fuel Mozambique’s radical post-independence socialist politics
under Samora Machel’s presidency (1975– 1986) but it fell into disuse by ofﬁcials
following the end of the civil war (1976– 1992) and the subsequent neoliberal
reforms of the country’s political and economic system (Sumich 2013). It is
worth noting, therefore, that the revolutionary rhetoric of the past is now regain-
ing momentum outside ofﬁcialdom in these contexts of political discontent and
violence – as has also been noted, perhaps unsurprisingly, in relation to Nicara-
guan and South African gangs (Jensen & Rodgers 2009).
Secondly, the chants during what is predominantly called o greve – ‘the
strike’ – point to broader economic relations involving labour – and its
current absence. During the early post-colonial period under socialist policies,
labour was to be provided by the state through state-run enterprises and a
state system of, for instance, seed shops, agricultural collectives and factories
(Dinerman 2006). In the current post-socialist era of economic growth, contin-
ued poverty and rising prices, labour remains related to the state and its elite but
it no longer involves o povo. The idiom of the strike is thus also a way of shutting
down the business of the state, and the chants underline the conﬂict between
the (relative and experienced) absence of labour and rising prices.
This second dimension – of labour and its absence – also points to an inter-
national dimension of the strike. It suggests that there has been a process of
learning involved – of format, organisation and success – from 2008 to 2010.
Many of those I spoke to in Chimoio in July–August 2011 and in Maputo in
January 2013 pointed to large-scale transnational protest movements against
the effects of marginalisation, unemployment or corruption. The events in
England (see also Zˇizˇek 2011) mentioned above were often invoked by my
Maputo and Chimoio interlocutors, for instance. Often with considerable
glee, they underlined rhetorically that violent protest was not merely the prero-
gative of os negros (black people) but also carried out by white people. Put dif-
ferently, for my interlocutors, the urban disturbances in England legitimised
their participation in and the format of the Mozambican popular uprisings.
With recent movements, such as Occupy Wall Street or Los indignados, an
argument may be made for a more comprehensive global ‘script’ of protest
that is laterally/horizontally and rhizomatically organised against a range of
ills and facilitated through various forms of digital interface, social media and
viral messaging (see Juris 2012). However, while the new technologies’ insurrec-
tionary potential emerged in Mozambique in the guise of viral messaging and
live media coverage, the popular uprisings here entailed a far more direct
confrontation with the state, its apparatus and its domains than many current
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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North American and European protests. Through blocking the state’s arteries
(roads and roundabouts), attacking police stations and police ofﬁcers, chanting
slogans against the party in power and by engaging in looting that was regarded
as a form of re-distribution, the strikes unsettled, at least momentarily, the
apparatus and elite of the post-colonial state. Crucially, many interlocutors
also made a direct connection to recent events in other African countries,
and speciﬁcally to the violent Malawian protests of July 2011 (AFP 2011).
However, although the protests in neighbouring Malawi were seen as inspiring,
a young Chimoio friend working as a black market money changer pointed out
a signiﬁcant difference in an interview in August 2011:
In Malawi, they had leaders. These organized the protests. For us, there are no
leaders. And we do not want leaders! For us . . . we are just o povo [the people]. We
do it ourselves!
He was not alone: many I spoke to took pride in such self-organisation as being
inspired by Samora Machel’s poder popular (popular power), now fuelled by text
messaging and mobile phone technology. Interestingly, the discarded politics of
populist socialist rhetoric – such as o povo and poder popular – re-surfaced as a
politico-cosmological framing for the protests and their organisation. Spontane-
ity, creativity and the immanent threat of the mass were celebrated here as a par-
ticular resource that may be mobilised (see also Buur 2009). Also historically
(mid-August to mid-September 1991), the mobilisation of crowds – ostensibly
in the service of poder popular – had escalated into an uncontainable force in
Maputo when groups of people took over policing and lynched around 20
alleged criminals (Mozambiqueﬁle 1991; see also Granjo 2008).
Rather than merely reﬂecting international protests or showing the potential
of new digital technology, the recurring strikes highlight the nature of state
authority in Mozambique as confronted by forces not only external to it but
also by those internal to it through, for instance, the complicity of police ofﬁcers
and other security agents. From such a perspective, the very order of the
Mozambican state is set against a range of alternative and shifting entities of
which the rapidly gathering and dissolving urban crowd of the greves is one.
Such confrontations between processes of state ordering and formations of pol-
itical and social discontent beyond state control produce impermanent urban
zones of state and non-state presence.
This unsettledness does not just reﬂect a long-term distinction between
domains where state authority and citizenship rights apply and where they
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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do not – as reﬂected in established debates on rural and urban forms of citizen-
ship in Mozambique (O’Laughlin 2000) and in Africa more widely (Englund &
Nyamnjoh 2004). Rather, the sheer number of protests across many urban
African contexts over the last few years indicates that there is increasing discon-
tent with both formulaic neoliberal reform and formalist forms of (urban) citi-
zenship. Bond and Mottiar (2013: 289), for example, note that South Africa’s
‘high level of social protest known as “popcorn protest” for its tendency to
ﬂare up and settle down immediately’ is increasing rapidly and that in 2011–
2012 there were 1091 incidents reported as ‘unrest’. In a similar vein, Chance
(2013) analyses the role of ﬁre in recurring revolts and protests in South
African townships, which signals a resurgence of ‘ungovernable collectivities
[that] threaten sovereign power’.
In line with Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2012; see also Simone 2004; Simone &
Abouhani 2005; Berg 2010) argument about African metropolises forecasting
global urban futures, I see such confrontations, uprisings and ‘unrest’ as mani-
festing global cities’ increasingly polycentric, nodal or hybrid form of govern-
ance impacting spatial ordering and security arrangements (Goldstein 2010;
Paasche et al. 2013). Arguably, these developments entail growing urban
domains of unsettledness, where police ofﬁcers or private security guards, for
instance, do not necessarily exercise state authority but actively produce con-
frontations and themselves engage in the popular uprisings.
At an analytical level, that various Mozambican agents of law and violence
participated in these events adds another dimension to the existing spectral
character of policing – as Benjamin (1986) and, later, Agamben (2000) have
asserted – in which police ofﬁcers are commonly believed to participate in
bribery, assassinations, kidnappings or organised crime. However, for
Chimoio (as noted above), the strikes and their participants assume additional
signiﬁcance because state representatives recently de facto allocated a sover-
eign authority to people in certain urban areas to exercise summary justice
(Bertelsen 2009a). While such allocation may be increasingly common along-
side a growing conjunction of development and security (Baker 2008;
McNeish & Lie 2010), it nonetheless entails forms of mobilisation and political
agency that generate other egalitarian collectivities, such as the 2008 and 2010
strikes.
Conclusion
Depending on one’s perspective, the 2008 and 2010 popular uprisings may be
seen as having been ‘successful’ in the sense of achieving immediate goals, such
ethnos, 2014 (pp. 1–28)
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as barring increased prices for basic commodities and services. However, on an
analytical level, the uprisings generated novel collectivities and an ephemeral
political authority that was neither imagined nor desired by Mozambican
state agents. It is difﬁcult to ascertain what the long-term effects of such recur-
ring encounters between rioters and state agents will be in terms of state stab-
ility, police accountability, Frelimo’s future and the potential for the political
opposition to capitalise on popular discontent.
However, events in 2013 and 2014 seem to indicate that memories of the
large-scale strikes in 2008 and 2010 are signiﬁcant, as a number of further pro-
tests have emerged across the country: for instance, there were spontaneous
violent protests in Beira after it was rumoured that the Mozambican military
were forcibly drafting young people into its armed ranks to be deployed in
increasing military confrontations with Renamo in 2013 and 2014 (AIM 2013a;
Mediafax 2014). In addition, numerous other events – such as a violent clash
between a group of opposition supporters and the Mozambican riot police
and Frelimo supporters (AIM 2013b) during the recent election campaign –
indicate an on-going effect (both in terms of memory and as a form of mobil-
isation) of the 2008 and 2010 strikes.
Beyond its effect on Mozambican city streets, it is clear that these two large-
scale popular uprisings have destabilised the image of a powerful sovereign state
under the control of Frelimo, which has at times lost control of urban spaces in
both the capital Maputo and in other large cities such as Chimoio. Therefore, as
anthropologists concerned with notions of sovereignty in Africa, we should
neither conﬁne our research to the centric contexts of capitals nor should we
only analyse its elites – whether these be government ofﬁcials or development
bureaucrats. Rather, anthropology should also recognise both the popular
uprisings’ dimensions of effervescence, creativity and feast and the participants’
exertion of a directed and highly egalitarian political form of action through the
occupation of state spaces and attacks on police stations. The notions of effer-
vescence and ephemerality that characterised the popular uprisings are key
aspects of a form of post-colonial politics as it unfolds in contexts such as
Mozambique – a form that is irreducible to the orderly world of representation
(through NGOs, trade unions and political parties, for example) or to well-
orchestrated participation in public discourse (through mass media in its
various forms).
This means that we can neither uphold an image of the post-colonial
subject in Mozambique as solely interested in his/her wellbeing nor claim
that the composite nature of a one-party state embroiled in development
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politics and elite accumulation has somehow subdued Mozambicans – or
embroiled the rulers and the ruled in a mutually disempowering relationship.
This is not to say that poor people in the bairros are generally optimistic:
quite the opposite is the case: cynicism reigns and they express little hope
for themselves in terms of economic development. Despite this outlook,
however, politics is followed closely, commented upon and critiqued, and
the fact that people also engage in risky direct action – such as the strikes
– testiﬁes to such political engagement. More broadly, the case of the
popular uprisings also signals that anthropology should be careful about
reproducing the ofﬁcial rhetoric of ‘multiparty democracy’ or about analyti-
cally conforming to the technicalities of procedural approaches to citizenship,
politics and democracy. The strikes are multisemic, festive and carnivalesque
events that ephemerally unsettle and appropriate elements of post-colonial
state sovereignty; they are instances of the kinds of non-conforming political
engagements with which anthropology should be concerned (see also
Obadare & Willems 2014).
To return to this article’s starting point, Bayart’s notion of the post-colonial
‘rhizome state’ does not seem to have universal application to post-colonial
states such as Mozambique. Here, rhizomic capacities inherent in the popular
uprisings present themselves as unmoored and have the capacity to disorder
and confront state spaces, state agents and domains of wealth. In these contexts,
rhizomic networks do not, as they do in Bayart’s analysis, link the low and high
in multiple symbolic and material ways to comprise a ‘mesh of networks’ that is
controlled by and constitute the post-colonial state.
Bayart himself notes that ‘[w]e are also “tired of the tree”, of this arboreal
metaphor of the state which, in truth, has exhausted the theoreticians. Our
time would be better spent trying to understand mysteries of the rhizome’
(Bayart 1993: 221). Indeed, but the ‘mysteries of the rhizome’ involve wholly
novel forms of engagement in politics and democracy in Mozambique and
beyond, and these forms have a horizon beyond that of a predatory state
resting on a ‘mesh of networks’. That is to say, the politics of the Mozambican
strikes are of open and experimental kinds – replete with egalitarian aspirations
and exuberance that are not contained in the bleak imagery of the post-colonial
political order often circulated by, for instance, Bayart. While the present
reading is optimistic – and sustained by more recent new forms of protest in
Mozambique in 2012, 2013 and 2014 – it also corresponds to what is said by
those who took part in or sympathised with the popular uprisings in
Chimoio: ‘Now they are afraid of us’.
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Notes
1. A near similar translation by Karen E. Fields from the French original is provided in
Durkheim (1995 [1912]: 212f).
2. Forwarded to me by a Mozambican friend, the original (including typos and mis-
spellings) reads: ‘Mocambicano prepara-te no grande dia de greve 01/09/10. Reven-
dicamos sobre a subida de precos J e energia, a`gua, arroz, xapa e pa¨o. Envia pra
outrosMocambicanos.’ While various text messages were disseminated, they all indi-
cated 1 September 2010 as a strike day against price hikes.
3. Greve participants generally conform to Rude´’s (2005 [1964]: 4) notion of ‘crowd’,
which includes ‘political demonstrations and what sociologists have termed “the
aggressive mob” or the “hostile outburst” – to such activities as strikes, riots, rebel-
lions, insurrections, and revolutions’. I follow Mazzarella’s (2010) work in seeing
the notion of the crowd not in the pathologising sense famously expressed by
Gustave LeBon but by viewing these as harbouring great generative potential and
being ‘anarchically unruly’.
4. A term such as ‘riot’ is problematic in that it is commonly employed in imprecise
and/or state-centric ways (see also Ginty 2004). Reading this material, it becomes
clear that the terms ‘strike’ and ‘popular uprising’ better capture the empirical com-
plexity and the politics of the events in question that are in Mozambique often called
greves.
5. Given the politically sensitive issues around the strikes, all persons quoted in this
article are un-named to protect their conﬁdentiality.
6. While media speculation has been rife about the circumstances of the ﬁrst text
message, neither a ‘ﬁrst sender’ nor allegations of mass distributions have been ver-
iﬁed.
7. Shangaan is the dominant language in Southern Mozambique.
8. The dominant language in the Chimoio area is chiTewe, and key works from the
Manica region have been consulted in order to form the spellings given here.
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